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Abstract. Recent attacks on standardised hash functions such as SHA1 have
reawakened interest in design strategies based on techniques common in prov-
able security. In presenting the VSH hash function, a design based on RSA-like
modular exponentiation, the authors introduce VSH-DL, a design based on expo-
nentiation in DLP-based groups. In this article we explore a variant of VSH-DL
that is based on cyclotomic subgroups of finite fields; we show that one can trade-
off performance against bandwidth by using known techniques in such groups.
Further, we investigate a variant of VSH-DL based on elliptic curves and extract
a tighter reduction to the underlying DLP in comparison to the original VSH-DL
proposal.
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1 Introduction
Hash function design Hash functions can be considered, together with block ciphers,
to be the core primitives on which modern applied cryptography is based. The design
of block ciphers is guided by a fairly mature and well understood background, see for
example linear [14] and differential [3] cryptanalysis and the wide-trail design strategy
of the AES [7]. In contrast, standardised hash functions such as SHA1 are constructed
using somewhat ad-hoc techniques and they are essentially derived from the same fam-
ily. This fact has, in part, contributed to a number of recent collision attacks against
designs including SHA1 [20, 21].
Ideally, a hash function with output length n is a parameterised, deterministic func-
tion H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n that takes an arbitrary length bitstring and maps it to a
bitstring of length n. A good hash function satisfies several properties, the three most
important of which are stated informally below.
1st-Preimage resistance Given a random image x ∈ {0, 1}n, it should take time ≈ 2n
to find m ∈ {0, 1}∗ such that H(m) = x.
2nd-Preimage resistance Given a ‘random’ m ∈ {0, 1}∗, it should take time ≈ 2n to
find m′ ∈ {0, 1}∗ such that H(m) = H(m′) and m 6= m′.
Collision resistance It should take time ≈ 2n/2 to find m,m′ ∈ {0, 1}∗ such that
H(m) = H(m′), yet m 6= m′.
Since generic black box attacks are known that find collisions in time ≈ 2n/2 or preim-
ages in time≈ 2n, the above requirements are very strong. In many scenarios it suffices
to achieve a relaxed notion of collision resistance, in the sense that attackers who can
invest only time 2k cannot find collisions, where possibly the output length n is larger
than 2k. Thus, these hash functions might not strictly satisfy the standard security no-
tion, even though collision resistance may provably be linked to a well studied hard
problem, using the type of exact reduction also known from provable security. The
tightness of the reduction and our belief or current understanding of the hardness of
the underlying problem then lead to a parameter choice for which the resulting hash
function has the desired collision resistance.
Hash functions based on modular exponentiation One of the first provably secure
collision resistant hash functions is based on exponentiation modulo an RSA modulus,
that is H(m) = xm mod N where m is the message, N is the RSA modulus and x is
some predefined value in Z∗N . If m and m′ form a collision such that H(m) = H(m′),
then xm−m′ = 1 mod N which implies that (m −m′) is a multiple of the order of x.
This order will necessarily be a divisor of φ(N) and if certain conditions hold, knowing
any (nonzero) multiple of the order of x suffices to factorN in deterministic polynomial
time. Note that there is no restriction on the length of m which means that there is no
need for Merkle-Damga˚rd [8, 15] type constructions.
This scheme was recently extended by Contini et al. [6] who essentially propose to
use multi-exponentiation for the compression function instead of single exponentiation,
thus obtaining an improvement in performance by processing more message bits at the
same time. Let pi be the i-th prime number, for i = 1, . . . , k, where the product of
the k primes should be smaller than the RSA modulus. A message m is then split up
into l blocks Mi of equal length and the hash is computed as the multi-exponentiation
H(m) =
∏
i p
Mi
i mod N . An additional requirement is that the total bitlength of the
message m is smaller than 2k.
One of the disadvantages of VSH is the need for a secret RSA-modulusN . Someone
who knows how to factorN can construct collisions easily. A side-effect of this trapdoor
against collision resistance is that the modified Cramer-Shoup signature scheme [6]
based on VSH does not provide non-repudiation as one might expect (cf. ‘Creating Col-
lisions’ [6, p. 171]). Another disadvantage is the relatively large output length, namely
the size of the RSA modulus. This means that to provide 80-bit security, one needs
to use a hash function outputting approximately 1024 bits, rather than the desired 160
bits needed to thwart generic birthday attacks. To address these problems, Contini et
al. mentioned the possibility of building VSH-DL, a hash function based on multi-
exponentiation in DLP-based groups allowing short representations, such as elliptic
curves or cyclotomic subgroups (allowing trace or torus-based methods). This design
extends the corpus of previous work on DLP based hash functions, see [1, 2] for exam-
ple.
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Computation in finite field extensions The possibility to use finite fields with exten-
sion degree higher than one for public key cryptography has been known since the birth
of public-key cryptography. However, for a long time nobody paid much attention to
the subject since it was unclear whether the higher extension degree would offer any
significant advantage over prime fields. It was not until Lenstra and Verheul showed
the potential of working in a smaller subgroup of a larger field using their trace-based
method called XTR [13] that interest increased.
Since then, Stam and Lenstra [19] showed how to efficiently work in the cyclo-
tomic subgroup of a degree six extension field (provided that the characteristic satisfies
a mild congruency relation), and Rubin and Silverberg [16] showed how to compress
and decompress elements in this same subgroup using the theory of algebraic tori. The
method of Rubin and Silverberg, called CEILIDH, differs from XTR in that compres-
sion is injective allowing full and exact decompression (in XTR conjugates are mapped
to the same element). The downside of CEILIDH is that it is only a compression and
decompression mechanism: it does not support direct computation on the compressed
elements. Efficient arithmetic is still possible though, for instance by the method devel-
oped by Stam and Lenstra or the more involved hybrid methods by Granger et al. [10].
Main contributions Since methods known from the study of arithmetic and schemes
using cyclotomic subgroups can provide computational efficiency and reduced band-
width due to their compression properties, it is a natural question to ask to what extent
they can be used to implement VSH-DL. To address this question, in this paper we in-
vestigate VSH-DL type schemes based on the cyclotomic subgroup of a sixth degree
extension field and on elliptic curves.
Such schemes provide natural efficiency in terms of bandwidth which leads to a
smaller hash-output without compromising security against collision attacks; through
an experimental implementation we reason that this benefit is balanced against de-
creased performance compared to the original VSH-DL proposal. We do not make any
claims about other security properties of our proposed hash functions, although it is
easy to see that finding preimages is at least as hard as finding a collision. Thus it is
possible to pick a (longer) output length of the hash function such that one also has the
desired level of security against these two attacks. We believe that in many applications
the level of security against collision attacks and preimage attacks can be set the same.
Because our hash functions essentially depend on n > 2k, it is not recommended to
truncate the output of the hash function (cf. [17]).
The paper is organised as follows. After our introduction of VSH in Section 2,
we explore the possibility to base a hash function on a problem related to the discrete
logarithm problem in the cyclotomic subgroup of a sixth degree extension field in Sec-
tion 3, where we achieve a compression by a factor of three which represents a trade-off
against decreased performance versus the original VSH-DL under a similar assumption.
In Section 4 we discuss the possibility to use elliptic curves over prime fields. In that
case the collision resistance of the hash function can be based directly on ECDLP. Fi-
nally we present some experimental results and analysis in Section 5 before concluding
in Section 6.
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2 VSH and VSH-DL
Contini et al. [6] define and analyse a hash function called Very Smooth Hash (VSH),
which is a multi-exponentiation generalisation of the well known RSA-based hash.
They write down the multi-exponentiation as a square-and-repeated-multiply algorithm,
where they consider the processing of k bits (Step 5 in Algorithm 1 below) as a com-
pression primitive and view the full compression function as repeated application of
this compression primitive, which allows the computation of the hash function in a
streaming fashion. Recall that for i ∈ Z>0, we let pi is the i-th prime number.
Algorithm 1: VSH compression function [6].
Let N be an RSA modulus, let the block length k be the largest k for which
∏k
i=1 pi <
N . The VSH compression functionHV SH : {0, 1}<2
k
→ Z∗N is defined as follows for
an ℓ-bit message m consisting of bits m1,m2, . . . ,mℓ, where ℓ < 2k.
1. [Initialise] Set x0 ← 1, L ← ⌈ ℓk ⌉ and j ← 0.
2. [Padding] Set mi ← 0 for ℓ < i ≤ Lk.
3. [Merkle-Damga˚rd Strengthening] Let ℓ = ∑ki=1 ℓi2i−1 with ℓi ∈ {0, 1} be the
binary representation of the message length ℓ. Set mLk+i ← ℓi for 0 < i ≤ k.
4. [Finished] If j = L+ 1 terminate with output xL+1.
5. [Hash next block] Set xj+1 ← x2j ×
∏k
i=1 p
mj·k+i
i (mod N).
6. [Increase j] Increase j by one. Go back to Step 4.
It is not too hard to see that if we define Mi =
∑L
j=0 2
L−jmjk+i, taking into account
the padding and the strengthening, then the hash is computed as the multi-exponentiation
H(m) =
∏
i p
Mi
i mod N . In particular this means that one might be able to achieve
some speedups by using techniques known from the theory of addition chains.
Contini et al. mention precomputing products of primes: indeed, if k primes (or
bases) are given and a small positive integer b divides k, we can partition the bases in
k/b sets of b primes each and for each set precompute all 2b products of the different
primes in that set. During the actual hashing bits are processed in chunks of b bits so that
only k/b multiplications will be needed to process k bits of message (this is essentially
a simplified version of Pippenger’s algorithm). Contini et al. observe that instead of
using precomputed products of primes for chunks of bits, one can also use fresh primes
instead. Although this leads to a different hash function, called Fast VSH, it is based on
the same hardness assumption as standard VSH but, as the name suggests, considerably
faster (also compared to VSH with precomputation). A full description can be found in
Appendix A.
The collision resistance of VSH can be reduced to the VSSR problem.
Definition 2 (VSSR: Very Smooth number nontrivial modular Square Root [6, Def. 3])
Let N be the product of two unknown primes of approximately the same size and let
k ≤ (logN)c. VSSR is the following problem: Given N , find x ∈ Z∗N such that x2 =∏k
i=1 p
ei
i and at least one of e1, . . . , ek is odd.
Contini et al. note that, given the existing known factoring algorithms, it seems as hard
to solve the VSSR problem as it is to factor N (though they base their analysis on a
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more conservative relation). They also define a discrete log analogue to VSSR leading
to VSH-DL. An important advantage of VSH-DL over VSH is the lack of a trapdoor.
Definition 3 (VSDL: Very Smooth number Discrete Log [6, Def. 4]) Let p, q be primes
with p = 2q + 1 and let k ≤ (log p)c. VSDL is the following problem: given p, find in-
tegers e1, e2, . . . , ek such that 2e1 ≡
∏k
i=2 p
ei
i mod p with |ei| < q for i = 1, 2, . . . , k,
and at least one of e1, e2, . . . , ek is non-zero (where pi is to be understood to be the i-th
prime number).
Algorithm 4: VSH-DL compression function.
Let p be an S-bit prime of form 2q + 1 for prime q, let k be a fixed integer length,
typically k ≈ S/ logS. The VSH-DL compression function HDL : {0, 1}<(S−2)k →
Z
∗
p is defined as follows for an ℓ-bit message m consisting of bits m1,m2, . . . ,mℓ, with
ℓ < (S − 2)k.
1. [Initialise] Set x0 ← 1, L ← ⌈ ℓk ⌉ and j ← 0.
2. [Padding] Set mi ← 0 for ℓ < i ≤ Lk.
3. [Merkle-Damga˚rd Strengthening] Let ℓ = ∑ki=1 ℓi2i−1 with ℓi ∈ {0, 1} be the
binary representation of the message length ℓ. Set mLk+i ← ℓi for 0 < i ≤ k.
4. [Finished] If j = L+ 1 terminate with output xL+1.
5. [Hash next block] Set xj+1 ← x2j ×
∏k
i=1 p
mj·k+i
i (mod p).
6. [Increase j] Increase j by one. Go back to Step 4.
3 A Cyclotomic Subgroup Variant of VSH-DL
We begin with a brief overview of the mathematics underlying CEILIDH and XTR. This
overview is specifically tailored to our needs, for a more general introduction see [9]
and the references contained therein.
Let p be a prime and let Fp denote a finite field of order p and Fp6 a sixth degree
extension thereof. The multiplicative group F∗p6 is cyclic of order p6 − 1, which factors
as (p2−p+1)(p2+p+1)(p+1)(p−1). Let G be the unique subgroup of order p2−p+1
in F∗p6 . We call G the cyclotomic subgroup of F∗p6 . Alternatively, it can be regarded as a
specific algebraic torus of dimension 2 over Fp. It is argued [12] that the computational
complexity of the discrete logarithm problem in F∗p6 resides in this subgroup G of order
p2 − p + 1, since the subgroups of order dividing (p2 + p + 1)(p + 1)(p − 1) can be
efficiently embedded in proper subfields of F∗p6 , thus allowing to run a sub-exponential
algorithm in the smaller field.
Using a standard representation in Fp6 consumes≈ 6 log p bits which seems waste-
ful given that there are only ≈ p2 elements in G. This problem can be solved using
either XTR [13] or CEILIDH [16]. With XTR, the trace map
Tr : Fp6 → Fp2 : x→ x
p4 + xp
2
+ x
is used to compress an element in G to an element in Fp2 . This map is not injective;
since conjugates over Fp2 map to the same value in Fp2 it is essentially 3-to-1. One of
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the significant advantages of XTR is that it is possible to work directly with compressed
elements when performing an exponentiation. Unfortunately, this method does not gen-
eralise very well to multi-exponentiation on more than two bases which makes XTR
unsuitable for direct use in a VSH-DL variant.
CEILIDH is an alternative to XTR that offers only compression; that is, one cannot
compute directly with compressed elements. Formally, CEILIDH is a bijection between
G\{a} and (Fp)2\V (f), where a is some particular element of G and V (f) is a well-
defined subset of (Fp)2 (the notation V (f) stems from the fact that it is a variety defined
by a single polynomial). It is straightforward to extend CEILIDH into an injection from
G to (Fp)2. Clearly, given any collision-resistant hash function, applying an injection to
the result is not going to reduce its collision resistance.
One of the advantages of VSH-DL as described by Contini et al. is its use of small
elements pi. When we work directly with elements in G, there do not seem to be ele-
ments that are as efficient to work with. Since each group element is represented by six
base field elements and the order of the group is p2 − p + 1 one can prescribe at most
two base field elements to be small, the other four will follow and be of normal size.
However, an alternative presents itself by not working with elements in G, but rather
elements in the full field Fp6 and only map to G at the very end through powering by
(p3 − 1)(p+ 1), i.e. the cofactor of G in F∗p6 ). Thus our hash function will be
Ceilidh((
∏
i
hMii )
(p3−1)(p+1))
for suitably chosen hi ∈ F∗p6 .
In the following we will motivate this approach by showing that, when the elements
hi are chosen uniformly at random and then somehow replaced by a smaller sibling
in the same coset (under exponentiation with the cofactor of G), the hash function is
collision-resistant if the discrete logarithm problem in (a subgroup of) G is hard. Thus,
contrary to the original VSH-DL, we reduce from a standard discrete logarithm as-
sumption. Our proof uses a slightly more general notation than as above. We note that
the order of G itself need not be prime, although to provide collision resistance the
size of G’s largest DLP-hard subgroup of prime order will be relevant for determining
the maximal allowable message length. Our reduction is similar to that of Bellare and
Micciancio [2], but tighter because we reduce from the DLP in a prime order subgroup.
Definition 5 (DLP) Let Gq be a finite cyclic group of known prime order q and with
generator f . The discrete logarithm problem in Gq is to find, given y drawn uniformly
at random from Gq , the unique value 0 ≤ x < q such that y = fx.
Definition 6 (k-modified DLP) Let H be a finite cyclic group with generator h. Let G
be a subgroup of H with generator g = h|H|/|G|. Let ψ : H → H be a map such that
ψ(hi)
|H|/|G| = (hi)
|H|/|G| for all hi ∈ H. The k-modified discrete logarithm problem
for (H,G, ψ) is to find, given hi drawn uniformly at random from H for i = 1, . . . , k, a
nonzero solution (e1, . . . , ek) ∈ [0, q)k of
(
k∏
i=1
ψ(hi)
ei)|H|/|G| = 1
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Theorem 7 Assume q divides |G|, but q2 does not divide |H| and that k > 1. An at-
tacker that solves the k-modified discrete logarithm problem for (H,G, ψ) in time t with
probability ǫ can be used to solve the discrete logarithm problem in Gq ⊆ G in time
t + t′ with probability ǫ − 1/q, where t′ is essentially the time to perform a k-fold
double exponentiation in H.
Proof:
Given y ∈ Gq , we need to find x such that fx = y with the help of an attacker that
solves the k-modified discrete logarithm problem. Let h1 = ybihai for i = 1, . . . , k,
where the ai and bi are drawn uniform at random from [0, |H|). As a result the hi are
distributed uniformly as expected by the k-modified DLP attacker, so on input of these
hi the attacker will, with probability ǫ, return (e1, . . . , ek) such that
(
k∏
i=1
ψ(ybihai)ei)|H|/|G| = 1
hence
g
P
k
i=1 aiei = y−(|H|/|G|)
P
k
i=1 biei .
Note that y = fx for some (yet unkown) value of 0 ≤ x < q and that, w.l.o.g.,
f = g|G|/q. Since g is a generator of |G|, this implies that
k∑
i=1
aiei = −x(|H|/q)
k∑
i=1
biei mod |G|
and because q divides |G| also
k∑
i=1
aiei = −x(|H|/q)
k∑
i=1
biei mod q .
Now we can compute x if (|H|/q)
∑k
i=1 biei 6= 0 mod q. Since q2 does not divide
|H|, we know that |H|/q is invertible modulo q, so we need to show that
∑k
i=1 biei 6=
0 mod q with probability at most 1/q.
Because, given any hi ∈ H and 0 ≤ bi < q, there is exactly one ai such that
hi = h
aiybi , it follows that the adversary given the hi has no Shannon information on
bi when announcing the ei. Consequently, unless all ei are congruent to 0 modulo q
(which is not allowed by the restrictions on the ei),
∑k
i=1 biei is uniformly randomly
distributed modulo q, so the probability of it being 0 mod q is 1/q.
Q.E.D.
Algorithm 8: Modified VSH-DL compression function.
Let H be a finite cyclic group of known, factored order and generator h. Let G be
a subgroup of H with generator g = h|H|/|G|. Let q be a prime dividing |G| but not
|H|/q. Let ψ : H → H be a map such that ψ(hi)|H|/|G| = (hi)|H|/|G| for all hi ∈ H.
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Let Compress : G → R be an efficiently computable injection. Let k be a fixed integer
length such that (⌊log2 q⌋ − 1)k < 2k. The modified VSH-DL compression function
HMDL : {0, 1}
≤(⌊log2 q⌋−1)k → R is defined for an ℓ-bit message m consisting of bits
m1,m2, . . . ,mℓ with ℓ ≤ (⌊log2 q⌋ − 1)k as follows.
1. [Initialise] Set x0 ← 1, L ← ⌈ ℓk ⌉ and j ← 0.
2. [Padding] Set mi ← 0 for ℓ < i ≤ Lk.
3. [Merkle-Damga˚rd Strengthening] Let ℓ = ∑ki=1 ℓi2i−1 with ℓi ∈ {0, 1} be the
binary representation of the message length ℓ. Set mLk+i ← ℓi for 0 < i ≤ k.
4. [Finished?] If j = L+ 1 terminate with output Compress(x|H|/|G|L ).
5. [Hash next block] Set xj+1 ← x2j ×
∏k
i=1 ψ(hi)
mj·k+i
.
6. [Increase j] Increase j by one. Go back to Step 4.
For completeness, we note that the collision resistance of the hash function above
can be related to k-modified DLP by observing that the (implicit) map turning messages
into the relevant exponents for hi is injective on its domain (this is the reason for the
length restrictions on the message).
As mentioned before, we will instantiate Algorithm 8 with H = F∗p6 and G a
subgroup of order p2 − p + 1 which has cofactor (p3 − 1)(p + 1). Moreover for
Compress we will substitute Ceilidh. For efficient field arithmetic we restrict ourselves
to p ≡ 2 mod 9. In this case pwill generate Z∗9 andΦ9(x) = x6+x3+1 is irreducible in
Fp. Hence if γ is a root of Φ9(x) (i.e., a ninth root of unity), then (γ, γ2, γ3, γ4, γ5, γ6)
is a basis for the extension field Fp6 = Fp[γ]. The arithmetic based on this extension
also lies at the basis of the fast implementation [10] of XTR and CEILIDH.
Let a =
∑5
j=0 ajγ
j+1 ∈ Fp6 . We are interested in finding a small representation
ψ(a) of a such that multiplication of an arbitrary field element by ψ(a) will be relatively
cheap. We do this implicitly. Instead of giving a straightforward definition of ψ we show
how to sample efficiently and (almost) uniformly fromψ(F∗p6). This is done by ensuring
that ψ(F∗p6)(p
3−1)(p+1) gives rise to the (almost) uniform distribution over G.
We sample from ψ(F∗p6) as follows. Draw a0 and a5 uniformly and independently
at random from Fp. Let ψ(a) = a0γ + γ2 + a5γ6. That this works follows from the
following observation:
Lemma 9 The mapψ′ : F2p → G defined byψ′(a0, a5) = (a0γ+γ2+a5γ6)(p
3−1)(p+1)
has a range of at least p2/3 elements.
Proof: To prove the statement we will upper bound the number of collisions, that is,
sets of distinct pairs (a0, a5) and (b0, b5) such that ψ′(a0, a5) = ψ′(b0, b5). Equiva-
lently, we are counting the sets a and b of prescribed form a = a0γ + γ2 + a5γ6 and
b = b0γ + γ
2 + b5γ
6 such that a(p3−1)(p+1) = b(p3−1)(p+1). The latter equation can be
rewritten as (ap3b)p+1 − (abp3)p+1) = 0. This can be computed algebraically, giving
rise to initially six equations (one for each coordinate), but that can be simplified to
(a0 − b0)(1 + a0b0 + a5b5) = 0
(a5 − b5 + 2(a0 − b0) + a0b5 − a5b0)(1 + a0b0 + a5b5) = 0
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plus a third condition. Simultaneously satisfying the above two equations can only be
done if either (a0, a5) = (b0, b5) or if (1+a0b0+a5b5) = 0. Unless (b0, b5) = (0, 0) the
latter solution allows us substitution of either a0 or a5 in the third and final equation to
be satisfied (and note that only (0, 0) is in the preimage of ψ′(0, 0)). This third equation
will then yield a quadratic equation in either a0 or a5 that is only degenerate (i.e. equal
to zero) if both b0 = 0 and b5 = 0. Since a quadratic equation over a finite field has
at most two solutions, we have shown that any preimage of ψ′ has cardinality at most
three, from which the claim follows. Q.E.D.
One can improve performance considerably by picking small a0 and a5. The caveat
is that the security is no longer directly related to a clean DLP assumption. Our choice
will be to set (a5)i equal to 1 and let (a0)i depend on i, i.e. simply range through a
number of a0 values that are easy to multiply with. In particular, we use (a0)i = i + 1
for a given i.
For completeness we note that the preimage under ψ′ of 1 ∈ G in this case is
restricted to a0 = 0 or a0 = 1, which can be seen by using that a(p
3−1)(p+1) = 1
is equivalent to a(p2+p+1)(p+1) ∈ F∗p. Moreover, if a = a0γ + γ2 + γ6 and b =
b0γ + γ
2 + γ6, then a(p3−1)(p+1) = b(p3−1)(p+1) iff a = b or a, b are in the preimage
of 1.
Thus we are insured that as long as we pick the a0 distinct and unequal to 0 or 1 our
system is not obviously flawed and there is no reason to assume that the choice of our
ψ(hi) is weak. The resulting hash function can be proven secure assuming that solving
the following, admittedly tailor-made, problem is hard:
Definition 10 (Small Element DLP) Let p be a prime congruent to 2 mod 9 such that
p2 − p + 1 has at least one big prime factor q. Let γ be a ninth-root of unity and let
hi = (i+ 1)γ + γ
2 + γ6 ∈ F∗p6 for i = 1, . . . , k. The small element discrete logarithm
problem is to find, given p, a nonzero solution (e1, . . . , ek) ∈ [0, q)k of
(
k∏
i=1
ψ(hi)
ei)(p
3−1)(p+1) = 1 .
4 An Elliptic Curve Variant of VSH-DL
Since their introduction to cryptography by Koblitz and Miller, elliptic curves have
become ever more popular as a replacement for finite fields to base DLP-based schemes
on. This is mainly due to the fact that there is no known algorithm to solve the DLP on
a general elliptic curve faster than the generic Pollard-ρ method. This allows one to use
curves with group sizes quadratic in the security one wishes to offer.
An immediate result of this is that to obtain 2k bit security against collision-finding,
one can actually use a hash function based on VSH-DL that outputs just over 2k bits
(by using affine representation and standard point compression, where the Y -coordinate
is replaced by a single bit to resolve any square root ambiguity). Moreover, the com-
putations are relatively fast. In this article we concentrate on curves over prime fields,
though similar results are expected to hold for curves over binary or ternary fields.
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An elliptic curve over a prime field Fp with p > 3 can be represented using the short
Weierstrass form
Y 2 = X3 + a4X + a6
where it is common to use a4 = −3, for example in the NIST standard curves, in
order to extract some performance benefits. The set of points (X,Y ) ∈ F2p satisfying
the equation above together with a point at infinity form an abelian group under the
addition operation also known as the chord-tangent process. The point at infinity serves
as group identity and the negation of a point (X,Y ) is (X,−Y ).
Optimising elliptic curve arithmetic has been the focus of a large number of articles.
Excellent overviews are given by Brown et al.[5] and Hankerson et al.[11]. One of the
most efficient methods is the use of mixed coordinates, where the fixed multiplicands
are kept in affine representation but where computations are done using the Jacobian
representation. Point doubling with the Jacobian representation costs 4 field multiplica-
tions and 4 field squarings. Adding an affinely represented point to a point in Jacobian
representation costs 8 field multiplications and 3 field squarings. The result again is in
the Jacobian representation.
One could consider the use of small points Pi. However, it seems that only one of
the coordinates of Pi can be picked small, since the other coordinate typically follows
from the curve equation (indeed, if a4 = −3 and a6 has full size, it is impossible for
both the X and the Y -coordinate of a point on the curve to be small). It is easy to see
from [11, Algorithm 3.22] that both coordinates are used only once during the point
addition, so picking small Pi’s will reduce the cost of a point addition by at most one
field multiplication.
A possible solution to this problem is the use of a Montgomery representation.
Recently Brown [4] showed how to perform a multi-exponentiation efficiently in this
setting.
5 Experimental Results
Strategy The crucial operation in the implementation of VSH is
xj+1 ← x
2
j
k∏
i=1
p
mj·k+1
i (mod n).
This product can be computed in several ways by reshuffling the order in which the
multiplications take place. One option is to start with x2j and then multiply by the rele-
vant pi terms one by one, reducing each time. The option recommended by Contini et
al. is to first compute the product
P =
k∏
i=1
p
mj·k+1
i
and then multiply by x2j . Due to the choice of parameters, the productP will be smaller
than the modulus N when computed over the integers, so modular reductions are not
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slow fast b = 2 fast b = 4 fast b = 8
SHA1-160 26.29 (or 16.89 with SIMD)
VSH 632.36 622.11 370.37 277.60
VSH-DL-A 715.71 676.04 382.68 274.75
VSH-DL-B 5507.54 6244.37 3126.34 1338.18
VSH-DL-C 16080.26 11777.89 7542.05 4105.31
Table 1. A comparison between the original VSH design and three variants of VSH-DL.
Results are given in clock cycles per byte of input.
necessary. VSH relies on this feature of the pi, or small element values to enable the
construction of high performance implementations. It also acts as the bottleneck for
our compressed VSH-DL variants. Specifically, it is much harder to reason about how
one would delay reductions in either the cyclotomic subgroup or elliptic curve cases:
although one can attempt to construct some notion of small elements, it is difficult to
imagine how performing computation with such elements will be as efficient as in the
original VSH case.
Results In order to evaluate the relative performance characteristics of our VSH-DL
designs versus the original proposal by Contini et al. [6], we produced some experi-
mental results using an implementation in C. Our platform for these experiments was
a 2.8Ghz Intel Pentium 4; we used GCC 4.0.1 to compile our implementation which
relied on NTL [18] for the underlying arithmetic. We produced an implementation of
the original VSH scheme and three variants of the VSH-DL scheme as detailed below:
VSH The original VSH scheme operates modulo an RSA number N = pq for primes
p and q. The parameters p and q were selected such that log2(N) = 1024.
VSH-DL-A The first variant represents the original VSH-DL scheme of Contini et al.
by working in the group of integers modulo a prime p such that p = 2q + 1 for
some prime q. The parameters p and q were selected such that log2(p) = 1152.
VSH-DL-B The second variant represents the cyclotomic subgroup based VSH-DL
design as described in Section 3. It works in a group G which is a subgroup of F∗p6 .
The parameter p was selected such that log2(p) = 192. In this implementation we
were careful to use delayed reduction techniques to improve arithmetic in G, and to
construct a dedicated multiplication function for multiplication by small elements
which have a special, sparse form.
VSH-DL-C The final variant represents the elliptic curve based VSH-DL design as de-
scribed in Section 4. It works in a prime subgroup of a curveE(Fp). The parameter
p was selected such that log2(p) = 192. We considered only random curves of the
form
E : Y 2 = X3 − 3X + a6
such that special reduction techniques such as those for Mersenne primes were not
available; one might expect an incremental improvement in performance by using
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such a parameterisation. We used Jacobian projective coordinates and a mixed-
addition strategy as is common in many point multiplication methods. The form of
arithmetic on the curve meant that a dedicated point addition function for addition
of small elements did not give any significant benefit.
For each variant, our parameter selection is such that the security of the resulting hash
functions is roughly equal. However, we make no attempt to to select values of k that
are sensible for the different variants; we use k = 131 in all cases. The results in Table 5
detail the performance of our variants; the figures quoted are clock cycles per byte of
input measured using the rdtsc instruction. They do not include the cost of initialising
the hash function, for example pre-computation of any tables of small elements. We
include results, following the nomenclature of Contini et al., for both slow and fast
versions: the fast version blocks the input and uses some pre-computation to improve
performance.
Analysis Even considering incremental performance improvements by using, for ex-
ample, Mersenne primes in the elliptic curve case, our VSH-DL variants perform at
least an order or magnitude worse than either the original VSH or VSH-DL proposals
by Contini et al. In this respect, their worth in terms of pure performance is untenable.
This is exacerbated when one considers that hardware acceleration for modular multi-
plication as used in VSH is commonplace as a result of use in RSA; one might expect
significant performance improvements in a practical setting as a result.
However, one area of advantage which our cyclotomic subgroup variant of VSH-DL
gives is memory footprint. That is, the computation of small field elements is essentially
free in comparison with the computation of the small primes used in VSH. For the
figures in [6][Section 5] one can see that VSH pays a hefty price in terms of memory
real-estate to achieve the levels of performance indicated in our results. Although the
performance is lower, our cyclotomic subgroup variant of VSH-DL requires far less
memory.
A more subtle issue is the selection of the k parameter. By increasing k, which
roughly speaking is the block size of the hash function, one can decrease the number
of squaring operations in the compression function; the number of multiplications stays
the same. The choice of k for VSH is motivated by the need to avoid modular reductions
in computing the product P from above. In our schemes we have already highlighted
the fact that it is not easy to avoid such reductions; as such we can be more flexible in
our choice of k.
6 Conclusion
In this article we have examined in depth the possibility to base VSH-DL on either
cyclotomic subgroups of finite fields of extension degree six or on elliptic curves of
large prime characteristic. We concluded that for cyclotomic subgroups using CEILIDH
we can get a hash function that is about an order of magnitude slower than the original
VSH-DL proposal, secure under a slightly different assumption (due to an inevitable
redefining of what constitutes a small element), but has a compression factor that is
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three times as high. Using elliptic curves, we derive a hash function that is significantly
slower than the original VSH-DL proposal, but whose compression factor is six times as
high and its security can be directly linked to that of the standard ECDLP. In both cases
the poor performance is balanced by a potential saving in terms of memory footprint.
We reiterate that our main concern was provable collision resistance under a discrete
logarithm-like assumption. Like VSH and VSH-DL on which our constructions are
based, our scheme provides only collision resistance and may not be suitable to replace
a random oracle in all situations.
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A Fast VSH
Recall that for i ∈ Z>0, we let pi be the i-th prime number. Let N be an RSA mod-
ulus, let k be the block length and let b be the chunking factor. To avoid intermediate
reductions, one should ensure that
∏k
i=1 p(2b−1)i < N . Note that the Merkle-Damga˚rd
strengthening listed below might allow collisions on messages of length greater than
2bk, but for reasonable parameter choices of b and k this will not be an issue.
Algorithm 11: VSH compression function [6].
The VSH compression function HV SH : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗N is defined as follows for an
ℓ-bit message m consisting of bits m1,m2, . . . ,mℓ.
1. [Padding] Set L ← ⌈ ℓbk ⌉ and mi ← 0 for ℓ < i ≤ Lbk.
2. [Radix Conversion] Set Mi =
∑b−1
j=0 mb(i−1)+j+12
j for 0 < i ≤ k.
3. [Merkle-Damga˚rd Strengthening] Let ℓ = ∑ki=1 ℓi2(i−1)b with ℓi ∈ {0, 2b − 1}
be the 2b-ary representation of the message length ℓ. Set MLk+i ← ℓi for 0 <
i ≤ k.
4. [Initialise Loop] Set x0 ← 1 and j ← 0.
5. [Padding] Set mi ← 0 for ℓ < i ≤ Lbk.
6. [Finished] If j = L+ 1 terminate with output xL+1.
7. [Prepare product] Set P ← ∏ki=1 pMi+(i−1)(2b−1) skipping those i for which
M − i = 0.
8. [Hash next block] Set xj+1 ← x2j × P (mod N).
9. [Increase j] Increase j by one. Go back to Step 6.
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